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DEFENSE PROCUREMENT-A COMPLEX OF
CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS
ERNEST F. LEATFIEM*
The defense procurement of the United States reaches directly
or indirectly into the lives of every inhabitant, young or old, in every
state and territory of our nation. It is of vast proportions, giving em-
ployment to many millions of people and spending nearly one-fourth
of each year's federal cash expenditures.' Paradoxically, however, it
is one of the least discussed, the least studied and the least understood
facets of our national life. Even within the agencies of the government
which conduct such procurement, and in the industrial complex which
serves it, disputes often arise which seem to indicate recurrent lack
of appreciation on both sides of the bargaining table of the complex
problems each is encountering.
It is the thesis of this article that there has developed, within the
field of defense procurement, a complex of conflicts and tensions of which
most people are only dimly aware; but that a recognition of these and
of their implications is a prerequisite to any intelligent appraisal by an
* Graduate of Washington & Lee University and Columbia University School of
Law; former Naval officer and procurement official; former senior official of Raytheon
Company; former Chairman of the Procurement Advisory Committee of the National
Security Industrial Ass'n; now, in retirement, a part-time management consultant.
1 In the budget now before Congress for the 1963 -64 fiscal year, the Defense Depart-
ment has requested forty-seven billion dollars. Of this, about $17 billion will be for
installations, maintenance, payrolls and related expenditures, and the balance of about
$30 billion will be for new purchases of services and material. This is one-third of the
total budget requests of $90 billion and one-quarter of the projected cash outlays of
$120 billion. The source of this data is the President's budget message to Congress.
No accurate source of data exists for total employment caused by defense procure-
ment, but industrialists are satisfied if each employee produces an average of $15,000 per
year of sales. On this ratio $30 billion of expenditures equals 2,000,000 employees, plus
all who work for the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Defense Department
in this field.
It should also be noted that the above data make no inclusions for the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) or for the National Space Agency (NASA), whose expenditures will
probably aggregate another eight to ten billion dollars in fiscal 1963-64.
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
informed and alert citizenry of the posture of our defenses and the
effects of our defense procurement upon our economy and our free
enterprise system.
THE ORIGINS OF OUR PRESENT SYSTEMS OF PROCUREMENT
Defense procurement today is conducted under the authority of
the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, which has had some,
though remarkably few, amendments since its enactment. In its
legislative history lie some of the seeds of present day problems.
When World War II burst upon the United States, the basic
military procurement statute' provided that almost all such procure-
ment must be on firm fixed-price contracts let after formal advertised
competitive bidding. It was at once apparent that such a slow, pon-
derous and publicly exposed technique was useless and dangerous in
times of national peril. The First and Second War Powers Acts were
passed, granting almost unlimited powers to the President, who in turn,
via many "executive orders," passed authority down to such depart-
ments as the Army, Navy and others. Under these broad directives,
many new, and therefore untried, methods and techniques of procure-
ment were devised and widely used. These included the choice of
several kinds of contracts, the use of plant surveys, the enlarged use of
audit agencies, the furnishing of government tools and equipment,
the application of techniques of price analysis and many more. Under
specific acts of Congress, annual statutory renegotiation was instituted,
and negotiated settlements of terminations for convenience were
allowed. Surveillance began not only of prime contractors, but also of
subcontractors, and beginnings were made toward the acquisition of
rights to use patents and trade secrets of private contractors.
It is a curious and remarkable fact that hardly any of these new
techniques or practices were ever attacked on the ground that there
was no statutory or constitutional authority for their usage Perhaps
this is because no one wanted to delay the war effort, or to so threaten,
by bringing such litigation, but more likely the reasons for this lie in a
combination of the general fairness of the unilateral settlements made
by the Services, either through negotiation or their Boards of
Contract Appeals, of disputes with their contractors, and the unwilling-
ness of individual contractors to sue such a large and important
customer.
When World War II ended, it was unthinkable to return to the
archaic forms of pre-war military procurement, and thereby abandon
the valuable lessons learned about new methods and techniques. The
Honorable James Forrestal, then still Secretary of the Navy, led a
team of military and civilian procurement specialists in the prepara-
2 Rev. Stat. § 3709 (1875).
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tion of a new statute to propose to Congress to replace the pre-war
statutes which would become operative upon the expiration of the War
Powers Acts. Early in the course of the discussions with Congressional
leaders about such a statute, it became apparent that many members
of Congress had a deep-seated suspicion of any procurement method
differing from the traditional advertised competitive bidding. To as-
suage these fears, and to facilitate favorable action upon the new
statute, the bill was phrased so as to require all procurement to be by
advertised competitive bidding except in any one of seventeen stated
sets of circumstances, under which negotiated procurement was
authorized. This has had the effect of leaving a large percentage' of
the number of purchases still subject to advertised bidding, but placing
the larger dollar value of orders under negotiated procurement.'
To this day, this has created conflicts between individual members
of Congress or Congressional Committees, on the one hand, and the
Armed Services, on the other. The former, sometimes supported by
General Accounting Office reports which purport (by hindsight) to
find inefficiencies resulting in "excessive profits," insist that the Services
buy more by advertised bidding and less by negotiation, or assert that
no true or effective competition is possible under negotiation. The
Services reply, however, that until a product's design specifications are
known and frozen, and are within the capabilities of several manu-
facturers to make, advertised bidding is impossible and dangerous.
They also have shown that competition between multiple bidders in
negotiated procurements can be even more intense and effective, be-
' cause it applies competition to design performance, and speed of
delivery, as well as price.
Defense industrialists largely support the views of the Services
in these arguments, knowing full well that under a negotiated procure-
ment, the Services can "keep the heat" on them in every way through-
out performance, whereas under advertised bidding, delivering a
product which meets the specifications on time is all that is required.
Continual Congressional pressures, however, have tended to drive
the Services to advertised procurements too early in the procurement
cycle. If investigations in depth of such cases were possible, it would
not be surprising to find that the aggregate costs to the government,
as well as delivery delays, were increased greatly by such premature
actions. These cases, however, are rarely investigated, because their
findings would not be compatible with the politically fixed ideas of
some members of Congress and of the General Accounting Office.
8 Now estimated to over 75%, per Department of Defense (DOD) presentations to
annual hearings of Procurement Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Ser-
vices.
4 Now in excess of 80%, per DOD presentations, op. cit. supra note 3.
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THE FETISH OF COMPETITION
Each of the Armed Services and the Department of Defense are,
however, deeply committed to creating competition as early as possible
in the procurement cycle, merely preferring negotiation as a technique
to reach this end. Competition, to them, is historically and mainly
price competition—with the laudable, and indeed mandatory, purpose
of obtaining the most possible for each defense dollar spent. Recently,
however, this has—in some cases—been extended to design competition
or to meeting performance as well as delivery schedules. In a few very
large systems projects, these different factors are weighted, as are
such things as ability to supply interchangeable parts and to service and
maintain the equipment more economically. Awards are then made on
the basis of the most favorable composite of all factors.
These can, of course, lead to spectacular arguments and investiga-
tions. The most recent one to hit the headlines is the TFX fighter plane
program—awarded by the Secretary of Defense's direction to one
bidder despite the particular Service's recommendation of another.'
At once, investigations were begun at the behest of the members of
Congress who represent the areas where the unsuccessful bidder has its
facilities. ° This case was, no matter how one views it, an exercise of
judgment, and none of those close to the decision would say otherwise,
whether they agree with its outcome, or not. To try to weigh and
evaluate so many complex factors is a bold task, and any decision is a
courageous one.
Unfortunately, in smaller and less newsworthy procurements,
price alone is often the only deciding factor, and to many contracting
officers, the use of any means to a lower price is justified by their
obligation to "the taxpayers." Every defense contractor knows of cases
where other supposed rights have been sacrificed on this altar of lower
price. One contractor's original designs, incorporating trade secrets
or data deemed in common law to be protected by proprietary rights,
are turned over to another bidder who, having no design costs to
amortize (and of ten no knowledge of the impending pitfalls of produc-
tion), underbids the designer. The Comptroller General has ruled/ that
if a responsible bidder is low in price, it is entitled to an award even
if it is known that the low bidder proposes to infringe the patents of
another bidder, who is left to recover damages, if he can, from the
success f ul in f ringer.
This fetish for price competition has also led to the creation-
5 The award was made to General Dynamics Corp.; the Air Force had recommended
Boeing Company.
0 Hearings were held in April 1963 before Senator McClellan's subcommittee of the
Armed Services Committee of the Senate.
7 Decision B-139585, 2 July 1959, of the Comptroller General.
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often at government expense—of duplicate production facilities, with
stocks of special tooling, far in excess of total production needs, merely
to create second and third sources of supply to compete with the
original producer.' This could, perhaps, sometimes be justified on
grounds of plant dispersion against attack, but such planning has had
little financial support from Congress.
Every taxpayer wants the defense dollar spent wisely, but many
might feel wisdom is not displayed when prices are shaded at the ex-
pense of fundamental private rights, or when indirect costs exceed the
"savings" from lower prices. Indirect costs are created by multiple
sources—more spare parts must be bought, catalogued and stockpiled;
drawings and maintenance and service data are duplicated; new
production personnel must be trained even as trained ones are idled;
new groups of subcontractors must be found and trained.
The fetish of competition is then, at least in part, a chimera, and a
false idol not to be worshiped blindly. Its true value lies in the in-
centive it creates to do a better, cheaper job—if this is not clearly the
result of its exercise, its values may often prove to be wholly illusory.
There are signs that this is beginning to be recognized in the Defense
Department—but the old "god" is still being worshiped on "the Hill."°
PROCUREMENT REGULATIONS
It has become common practice for an Executive Department,
when authorized to perform acts under a statute, to issue rules or
regulations as to how such actions are to be carried out. Thus, very
soon after the enactment of the Armed Services Procurement Act of
1947, administrative regulations began to appear to interpret, explain
and enlarge upon the statute. At first, these were issued by each of the
three Services separately, and as might be expected their regulations
were not always compatible or in agreement.
Shortly after the reorganization of the Defense Department as a
result of the so-called Key West Meetings,' jurisdictional cognizance
of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) Committee
was transferred from the old Munitions Board to the Office of the As-
sistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics),' and it was re-
constituted to formulate all new sections of ASPR and all revisions
to the initially issued sections of it. This Committee, today, is chaired
by a military officer of the rank of Colonel or the equivalent, and is
8 Many examples could be cited. One of the more recent is the Army M-14 rifle
program, involving three plants with government-furnished facilities and tooling. One
is now wholly idle.
o The Congress, on Capitol Hill.
10 In February, 1949, leading to the Amendments to the National Security Act of
1949.
II Now the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics (ASD(I&L)).
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composed of representatives of the procurement and legal branches of
each of the three Services, the ASD (I&L) and the Defense Depart-
ment Comptroller's Office. It has a permanent staff of civil servant
employees, and also functions through various working subcommittees
of both a permanent and ad hoc nature.
Ostensibly, this Committee's work is reviewable only within the
Defense Department hierarchy, and when it promulgates regulations,
all other regulations of the separate Services must in no way revise or
alter the basic ASPR. Unfortunately, it does not always work this way
—for each Service Department Secretary has an intervening veto
authority between the level of ASD (I&L) and the Under Secretary
of Defense.' Obviously, the Under Secretary and Secretary do not
have enough hours to meet all their other responsibilities and also to
resolve all detailed disputes or disagreements among the Services'
representatives on the ASPR Committee." The Committee, recogniz-
ing this, thus tends to operate under a rule of unanimity. In short,
major issues are not resolved—they are compromised, even though
compromise does not always lead to right or courageous decisions.
Should compromise prove impossible, nothing is done, unless and until
the Secretary or his Deputy steps in to make the decisions.
These organizational nuances make life difficult for those in the
ASPR Committee function, and for those industrial or trade association
representatives who attempt to digest and interpret business and in-
dustrial viewpoints for the Committee and its subcommittees. There
are, however, even more fundamental and far-reaching aspects of the
system which ASPR have created which need examination.
ASPR now consist of seventeen sections, aggregating 1726 closely
printed pages; in addition, there are six appendices, aggregating 397
more printed pages. Each of the three Services has its own regulations
of equal or greater length, which, though largely repetitive, are not
entirely so.' The sheer bulk of these documents impairs their useful-
ness, and even if wholly inadvertent, assures discrepancies. But worse,
however, is the fact that new or revised regulations are uniformly
made applicable as of a fixed date, but the ASPR date does not neces-
sarily become the AFPI date, and the others may become effective at
12 This, too, stems back to the Key West Meetings. At these, the Service Secretaries
were demoted to sub-Cabinet rank, leaving only the Secretary of Defense on the Cabinet.
As a compensating gesture, their rank was made higher than all Assistant Secretaries of
Defense.
13 This yds done to promulgate finally the ASPR provisions on Cost Principles,
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. H 15.000 to 15.603, after three years of disagreements between procure-
ment•officials, representatives of audit agencies and financial officers, and almost 100%
of industry spokesmen who were vocal on the subject.
11 Air Force Procurement Instructions (AFPI)—approx. 700 pages. Navy Procure-
ment Regulations (NPR)—approx. 200 pages. Army Procurement Policies (APP)—approx.
350 pages.
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still different times. Thus new policy may take weeks or months to get
into the particular writing which is the only "law" to a lowly con-
tracting officer in a particular Service's remote office.
Furthermore, some important ASPR provisions have, upon is-
suance, been made applicable to already outstanding contracts in the
process of performance or settlement, without providing for any addi-
tional costs caused to the complying contractor or additional appropria-
tions to the Services to cover such costs.'
It is arguable as to whether all of ASPR's provisions are "fair and
reasonable" and issuable under the express or implied authority of the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 or other statutes. It is a
hodge-podge of pure policy, general observations, detailed instructions
(some permissive and some mandatory), contract clauses (some
permissive and some mandatory), auditor's manual and internal
procedural directives. While it contains provisions for approval of
deviations,' the procedures are—probably of necessity—so long and
time-consuming that they are seldom used or useful.
It is in ASPR, aided and abetted by the Services' individual
regulations and directives, that onerous provisions have been imposed
which many defense contractors believe are invading proper managerial
functions or are undermining contractual rights. ASPR are replete with
clauses which might be cited as examples of these, but only a few will
be touched upon to illustrate these points.
ENCROACHMENTS ON MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES
Make-or-buy decisions, and choices of vendors and subcontractors,
go to the heart of a prime contractor's ability to perform a contract
well and on time, and to guarantee the finally assembled end-product.
Crises during performance may necessitate changes in such decisions,
or enlargement either of in-plant or subcontracted performance. Yet
recent additions to ASPR' 7 require that in some contracts, make-or-buy
programs and subcontract choices be approved as a part of initial
negotiations and in advance of starting work, and thereafter changed
only with the contracting officer's prior approval. Other provisions's
subject a prime contractor's purchasing system to survey and approval
prior to contract award or periodically thereafter, and require reviews
and approvals of individual subcontracts.
Inspection and quality control, throughout production and in
15 An example is the original provisions in ASPR requiring the advance approval of
the use of overtime or the payment of overtime premiums if such costs were to be allow-
able. For current regulations treating overtime, see ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 12.102 (Supp.
1963).
16 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 1.109 (Supp. 1963).
17 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.902 (Supp. 1963).
15 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.903 (Supp. 1963).
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advance of submission for final inspection, acceptance and delivery,
have long been considered vital to a contractor's control of his own
products, costs and reputation. The regulations require, in some
instances, the maintenance of an inspection and quality control system
"acceptable to the Government," and give government inspectors the
duty to "plan and conduct systematic evaluation and verification of
suppliers' inspection systems, [etc.] ...." 19
When and to what extent overtime or multiple shifts are to be
scheduled is usually a function of a plant's total obligations. ASPR''
make many of the costs of such overtime, or of shift pay differentials,
unallowable unless prior approval of such scheduling is obtained.
Every management is, or should be, conscious of costs and anxious
to hold them at or below competitive levels. Yet many types of costs
are either inevitably incurred," or desirably incurred" or necessary to
support the functions of the community in which a company operates?'
ASPR disallow, in whole or in part, some twenty-two elements of costs
of these and other types, and subjects nineteen other cost elements to
special review looking toward possible partial disallowance, 24 despite
the fact that each of these is, and has historically been recognized as,
a "cost" both in accepted commercial accounting principles and for
purposes of federal income tax computation. The effects of such dis-
allowances are, of course, to throw the recovery of such costs entirely
on non-government revenues (even though they are fairly allocable to
government contracts) or to diminish true profits while distorting up-
ward apparent profits on government contracts.' Many of the head-
to
	
32 C.F.R. § 14.104 (Supp. 1963). See also, ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-28
(Supp. 1963).
20 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 12.102 (Supp. 1963).
21 Costs for organization, holding of stockholder meetings, issuance of stock, etc.
22 Advertising, moving expenses to new employees, etc.
23 Civil defense expenditures, contributions to community chests and colleges, etc.
24 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. §§ 15.205-1, 205-2, 205-5, 205-6, 205-7, 205-8, 205-9, 205-11,
205-12, 205-13, 205-15, 205-16, 205-17, 205-19, 205-22, 205-23, 205-29, 205-31, 205-32,









Government $1,000,000 $ 900,000 $100,000— 10%
Commercial 1,000,000 950,000 50,000—	 5%
Totals $2,000,000 $1,850,000 $150,000--7%%
Government Government	 "Excess
Allowed Profit	 Profit" Profit
Costs Shown	 Recaptured Result
Government $	 850,000 $150,000-15%	 $50,000 $100,000
Commercial 950,000 50,000— 5% —0—
Totals $1,800,000 $200,000-10% $100,000--5%
By the government's disallowance and recapture of alleged "excessive profits," rendered
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lines about "excessive profits," generating from General Accounting
Office reports to Congress, are, upon analysis, profits distorted upward
by the disregarding or disallowance of truly incurred reasonable and
allocable costs.
SEIZURE OF PROPERTY
One of the most complex problems dealt with in ASPR is the
treatment of patents, copyrights and technical data.' It has long been
the policy of the Defense Department and of the Armed Services, as
to patents and copyrights owned by a contractor but originating from
the performance of a military order, to require a royalty-free, non-
exclusive license for government end-use. Few if any contractors have
objected to this, especially since historically the Armed Services have
respected outstanding background patent rights and paid minimum
royalties for their use. The recent awards to prospective inf ringers,
mentioned earlier, are the first break in the respect given patents.
This has not been true in all governmental procurement. When
the Atomic Energy Commission was established, it was provided that
all patents arising from its contracts became the property of the gov-
ernment, and not of the AEC's contractors." No doubt this policy
originated partly from the high security classifications under which
such contracts were performed, and partly from a fear of having such
awesome knowledge, power and rights in private hands. Later, when
the National Space Administration (NASA) was authorized to conduct
its own procurement, Congressional sponsors of government owner-
ship were successful in requiring NASA contractors to give the govern-
ment ownership of patents, subject to limited powers to release them
back to the inventors.' In the debates over whether the NASA system
should revert to the military system, or the military to the NASA
system, clear cleavages developed between those advocating public
ownership of all patents and those wanting a preservation of the pri-
vate ownership of patents contemplated by the Constitution.' Busi-
ness spokesmen, of course, ardently advocate the latter, and while
somewhat lukewarm on the issue, the Defense Department has gone
on record as desiring to preserve the status quo."
Not so, however, on the problems of proprietary data. Here the
Defense Department wants, by contractual fiat and without compensa-
"excessive" by disallowance of $50,000 of actually incurred costs, these costs must be
recovered from commercial profits, and reduce total profits, before taxes, to 5%—and
after a 52% Federal corporation tax, to less than 2270 on sales.
26 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. §§ 10.101 to 10.703 (Supp. 1963).
27 Atomic Energy Act, 68 Stat. 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (Supp. IV, 1962).
28 National Aeronautics and Space Act, 72 Stat. 426 (1958), 42 U.S.C. § 2457 (1958).
29 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
30 Testimony of DOD officials before Patents Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, April 1961; digested in 17 Weekly Report to Electronics Industry, No. 15,
Electronics Industry Ass'n.
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tion (except possibly as to background data), to acquire all it can get,
whether present needs for it are known to exist or not. Its real com-
pulsion seems to be the desire to be free and able to turn over to new
or additional sources everything needed from the original source to
allow the newcomers to manufacture the product and provide com-
petition to the originator. To the extent this requires the sacrifice with-
out compensation of secret processes, trade secrets, manufacturing
"know-how" and production techniques, the originators of data oppose
DOD policy strenuously—not only because they do not want to set up
competitors, but also because at common law such data has been held
to be property of value entitled to protection and, finally, because such
data is never wholly generated in performing a single contract, but
rather represents an accumulation of knowledge over the contractor's
total experience and operations.
In between these extremes, however, there is clearly a need within
the Services for such data, for a variety of demonstrable and legitimate
requirements. Typical of these are the data required for the manu-
facture and supply of replacement parts, the identification of the
product and its parts in catalogs and instruction manuals, the dif-
ferentiation of it from other products and the description of it and its
qualities in specifications.
Despite sincere efforts extending over many years, industry and
the ASPR Committee seem no nearer solutions of these problems, and
the vocal Congressional cry for patent ownership spurs DOD advocates
of data ownership to greater lengths. They now are proposing to reach
through the prime to secure the data generated by successive tiers of
subcontractors. Despite the limitations upon this now embodied in
ASPR, the contracts imposed on the prime contractors in the notorious
TFX procurement demand such data from the subcontractors.'
ASPR AS A MODEL
No other agency of the government has been as active or as prolific
in the promulgation of procurement regulations as has the Defense De-
partment and the three Armed Services. It is natural, therefore, that
other parts of the federal hierarchy have tended to adapt the ASPR
provisions to their own procurement, sometimes verbatim and some-
times revised to suit their own terminology or their own statutory
procurement authorizations.
Thus we see the Defense Supply Agency's regulations, those of
the General Services Administration, and even those of the Atomic
Energy Commission and of the National Space Administration closely
31 Letter From National Security Industrial Association to Hon. K. E. Be Lieu,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (I&L), March 7, 1963, commenting on clauses in Navy
TFX contract (copy circulated to NSIA members).
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adopting or following ASPR's lead. Because of this, ASPR may usually
be the bellwether of governmental policies and intentions. It deserves
every citizen's watchful and critical eye!
PLANNING FOR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT82
The defense establishment of the United States maintains many
large fixed installations at home and abroad, which must be serviced
and maintained, as well as its vast supplies of military equipment for
attack or defense on land, in the air and space, and on and under the
sea. The supplies and services and manpower needed to provide such
maintenance become, in effect, annual fixed charges in the United
States budget. In addition to these expenditures, and the planning that
goes into them, each of the Services as well as the Atomic Energy Com-
mission are pressing ahead in enlarging scientific knowledge, adapting
this knowledge to new or improved military equipment and regularly
replacing old but serviceable equipment made obsolete by such im-
provements.
The annual requirements for manpower and equipment stem
basically from top-level judgments of what our dangers are and will
be in the months and years ahead. These include evaluations by the
State Department, Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency,
National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The conclusions
reached are translated into military plans by the Joint Chiefs, and
thence into equipment and manpower needs by the operational staffs
of each Service. The aggregate costs of these needs are then estimated,
and tabulated under the guidance of the Comptroller of the Defense
Department and put into budget proposals for submission to Congress.
Almost inevitably, the sum of these cost estimates is greater than
any amount which the President and his advisers would propose or
which the Congress would accept, because they must appraise what
the nation's economy can bear and what will be politically acceptable
to the public. In forming these judgments, the President is guided by
many voices, including his economic advisors, the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce. Defense budgets must be
added to all other budgets for government operations. In short, every-
one gets into the act—and it is only natural that every Department,
just like each of the Armed Services, wants none of its projects or
proposals reduced or eliminated.
Under these circumstances, the ultimate decision-making must be
at very high levels, and somewhat autocratic and dogmatic. Strong
leadership, such as has been taken by Defense Secretary Robert Mc-
32 It will quickly be apparent that this segment of this article is a vast over-simplifi-
cation of one of the most intricate phases of government, but it is hoped enough will
be said to justify conclusions drawn later.
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Namara, inevitably offends some both within and without the Defense
Department, whether or not his decisions prove ultimately to have been
right or wrong. The danger is that the recommendations or decisions
will be made, whether by an individual or a group, without a complete
and accurate picture of the facts and appraisals of the alternatives
flowing from different decisions.
After all this is done, and the budget is before Congress for action,
there still remains the political interplay, in-fighting and trading-off
that goes on in Congressional committees and anterooms in order to
produce a budget that will be voted into effect. Many of our best in-
formed experts on military budgets and expenditures are Representa-
tives and Senators in the Congress, but it is impossible for every Con-
gressman to be so well equipped to make final judgments. Because
of their complexity, and importance to national safety, military bud-
gets probably fare better at the hands of the Congress than any other
segment of the total annual budget, but they often do evoke major
differences between Congress and the Defense Department."
FINANCING DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
A defense budget does not merely authorize the Defense Depart-
ment to spend a stated sum of dollars. Rather it is a composite of many
separate budgets, few of which are actually administered by any
official of the Defense Department. Most of these are budgets for
certain kinds or classes of expenditures by one of the subdivisions'
of the Services. There exists, therefore, a Comptroller organization
within each of the Services, with representatives in each of their sub-
divisions where separate budgets are spent and administered. These
are required to follow the policy directives of the Comptroller of the
Defense Department, but are under the command of the Assistant
Secretary of the particular Service who is responsible for financial man-
agement.
Each of these Bureau, Corps or Command Comptrollers, through
his staff, actually administers the budget assigned to his jurisdiction,
allocating funds for new contract placements, approving disburse-
ments against his budget and shifting funds to keep within budget
ceilings (to the extent allowed by law). The expenditure reports flow
to the offices of the Departmental superiors, and thence to the Comp-
troller of the Defense Department for informational purposes.
Occasionally, however, fiscal crises loom larger and beyond the
33 Typical examples have been: (a) the insistence by Congress that budgets include
funds to continue the RS 70 aircraft program when DOD recommended its termination;
(b) the provision of funds for aircraft carriers when DOD recommended more SAC
bombers instead; or (c) the reluctance to provide funds for the "Pine Tree" radar warn-
ing network in addition to the DEW Line.
34 Such as the Army's "Corps," or the Navy's "Bureaus" or the Air Force's "Com-
mands."
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mere administration of annual budgets. These may be intramural and
narrow in scope, such as finding funds to cover major contractual up-
ward repricing; or they may be national in scope, such as helping to
keep total government debt within the statutory debt ceilings by
reducing or delaying current expenditures; or they may be international
in scope, such as reducing the number of overseas dependents of mili-
tary personnel to contribute to reductions in the outward flow of gold
reserves.
Every defense contract usually has some payment withholding
provisions in it. Sometimes these are cumulative, and sometimes they
are subject to a percentage ceiling in the aggregate. These are intended
to be an incentive toward completion of contract obligations, so that
payments can be concluded. They are not meant to facilitate the
juggling of funds from one project to another or to further national
fiscal policies.
Nevertheless, in the past" payments due on outstanding contracts
have been totally suspended, or the rates of progress payments have
been reduced below the rates negotiated and specified in contracts,
or additional withholdings beyond stated ceilings have been made, all
because of temporary fiscal or debt ceiling crises. These actions have
usually been instituted through the Comptrollers of the Services, rather
than through contracting officers—and in several instances, were never
reflected in contract modifications.
These are not regular or common actions, but were exceptional
moves made under fiscal or financial stress. They show, however, the
lengths to which the Services can and have gone to meet their financial
problems by unilateral, unauthorized breaches of contract terms, some-
times accomplished without even going through contracting channels
in their own departments.
FRAGMENTATION OF AUTHORITY
The sheer bulk of actions which must be taken in connection with
defense procurement dictates a spread out, decentralized organization.
There is no other way to get so much done. The procurement activities
of the Services are carried out all over the world, and in many in-
stances, a long distance geographically from the policy-making head-
quarters in Washington.
There is, however, no real decentralization of ultimate authority
—only a decentralization for carrying on routine matters covered by
routine and specific regulations or instructions. All actions, therefore,
tend to become routine, and the different or unusual is avoided
wherever possible.
Military tradition includes the concept of monolithic, autocratic
35 Notably during the debt ceiling crisis in 1957.
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command. Thus a centralization of ultimate authority fits and is ac-
ceptable within this tradition. There is more to it than that, however.
The Constitution makes the President the Commander-in-Chief of all
the Armed Services, and the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs
of Staff report directly to him. The Congress looks to these two for
all information, facts and reports about procurement—and by statute
has charged the Defense Department with responsibility for policy
formulation and enforcement"—subject only to the higher status of
Service Secretaries over Assistant Secretaries of Defense, to which
reference has already been made.
In view of this, all tough decisions or ones involving major policy
or large amounts of money eventually flow up to at least Assistant
Secretarial levels in each department and in DOD. Those below this
rank, however willing and able they may be to make decisions and
accept responsibility for them, often cannot do so. But even more
significant is the way the functional activities begin to split apart
just below Assistant Secretary level. Wherever there is a fragmenta-
tion of authority, no one man can make total or final decisions.
Also, no such person with only.partial authority is anxious to propose
short cuts or new methods which invade another office's sphere of in-
fluence.
Therefore, in military procurement's organizational structure,
there are built-in bottlenecks to speedy action because of the many
fragmented sections which have to act—and there are also built-in
roadblocks to experimentation and deviation or change, because the
papers for approval would have to pass up and over and back through
so many pairs of hands.
Even though policy-making is centralized in the DOD Secretariat
levels, and is well delegated within DOD itself, it has already been
seen in connection with the ASPR Committee that the intervening au-
thority of Department Secretaries subjects policy formulation, in fact,
to the rule of unanimity, i.e., compromise.
The geographical dispersion of military procurement also tends
to formality and exchanges of writings and memoranda because the
informality of settling things orally and face-to-face is lost. In this
connection, however, it should be pointed out that the Navy, through
centralization in Washington, has not been so subject to this as have
the other Services.
POLITICS
Politics plays a large and continuing role in defense procurement.
It can take many forms; some direct, some indirect; some patriotic,
some self-seeking.
30 Dept. of Defense Reorganization Act, 72 Stat. 514 (1958), 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp.
IV, 1962) and Act of Organization, 10 U.S.C. § 2202 (1958).
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Of course, the impact of thirty billion dollars' expenditures for
goods and services in one year is tremendous, and every politician
would like to see some of it go to his district or state, and get some
credit for it. Hence, the public announcement of most large defense
contract awards is made via the cognizant Representatives or Senators,
preferably of the party then in power in the presidency. This is rela-
tively innocuous, but it remains true that few contracts of any com-
plexity can be negotiated or obtained via the halls of the House or
Senate Office Buildings. Their intervention is often taken by junior
government personnel in the services as interference or an attempt at
special influence, or as a threat for future investigation, however
scrupulous the Congressman's approach may be.
At least three types of social problems, each with political over-
tones, are required to be considered in placing defense contracts, even
though any of them might be diametrically opposed to making the
best choice of supplier. These are the set-asides and other favored
treatment given to "small business" (artificially and varyingly de-
fined), the special attention to placing contracts in "depressed labor
areas" (as determined by the Labor Department), and compliance
with the Buy American Act (which operates to give American labor
a twenty-five per cent subsidy against foreign labor costs). Within
this category, too, might be placed promises made by candidates dur-
ing political campaigns to get more defense contracts for their lis-
teners," although such promises are not yet ensconced in statutes or
regulations!
Other more important aspects of politics' effects on defense pro-
curement are found in the relationships between Congress and the
Defense Department and the three Armed Services. There is much
respect between these legislative and executive departments, but on
occasion, there is much friction and resentment, too. Regularly, Con-
gressional committees and sub-committees hold hearings about defense
procurement. Often, the work and the areas of interest of these separate
committees overlap and cause the duplication of testimony by DOD
and Service personnel. The time such personnel spend back at their
offices in the preparation of testimony, charts and exhibits, or the
assembly of data requested to be in certain forms, the searching of
files, the briefing of witnesses and the policy clearance of the state-
ments to be made, is prodigious and undoubtedly runs into thousands
of man hours per year. The time of top level officials and their im-
mediate staffs in giving actual testimony at hearings is also burden-
37 Examples:
Candidate D. D. Eisenhower to Lawrence, Mass, rally in 1952.
Candidate J. F. Kennedy to %Vest Virginia audiences in 1960.
Candidate E. M. Kennedy's slogan "I Can Do More for Massachusetts" in his
1962 Senatorial campaign.
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some to the extent it interferes with their other regular duties. This is
often prolonged by the desirability of explaining terms, background,
technological data and other facts to new or relatively uninformed
committee members. If sharp disagreements occur between witnesses
and committee members, personal accusations have sometimes been
made unworthy of both parties.
The General Accounting Office is an agency of the Congress, and
is the chief investigative agency for its committees in procurement
matters, especially as to prices, costs, accounting data, etc. It always
has, in such reports, the benefit of hindsight. It does not hesitate to
recommend changes of policy or of procurement practices which will
affect all defense suppliers, on the basis of fragmentary or isolated
instances of apparent laxity or impropriety. These reports embarrass
the Services and their personnel, and are always critical, because no
reports are made of investigations which show that all was well. Many
criticisms could be explained away by government or contractor per-
sonnel, but their views are not always solicited or reported.
It is difficult to assess the value of continuing, untrammeled, wide-
open and prolonged Congressional Committee hearings. They seem to
be less frequent and less virulent when the control of the executive
and legislative branches of the government are in the same political
party's hands, although with the liberal-conservative split which now
exists in each party, these lines are not clearly drawn. Surely the power
of investigation is a vital and important one to preserve for Congress,
for it is its chief public way to hear testimony from all viewpoints,
and to assay the need for and effects of legislative action. On the other
hand, their prolific and repetitive nature has undoubtedly interfered
with, and on occasion delayed, the orderly handling of defense pro-
curement."
BUSINESS REALIGNMENTS
Over the past eighteen years, since World War II ended, defense
business has become a very large, important and probably permanent
segment of our economy. It consists basically of something less than
five hundred corporations able and willing to take either prime con-
tracts or subcontracts, and another one thousand able and willing to
take subcontracts. With the advent and growth of placing complete
systems responsibility in one large prime contractor, many new man-
agement, control and review techniques have been devised to facilitate
38 Armed Forces Management, June 1963, p. 11, comments additionally as follows
on the McClellan Subcommittee's hearings on the placement of the TFX program:
While McClellan fiddles, the TFX falters. In short, the Committee has done little
more than hamper the acquisition of a new fighter, superior to anything cur-
rently in the inventory. Their decision' has done more to harm this program
and undermine unification and the Defense Secretary than anything done by
the Secretary's office since its creation in 1947.
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exchange of status and fiscal information between the prime contractor
and the Service department concerned. As the' Services have tended
more and more to delegate to the systems manager the purchasing
and coordinating functions formerly performed by the government,
their personnel fear that failure or blame for less than perfect pric-
ing and performance will come back to their detriment. Therefore, con-
trol and reporting requirements have been substantially enlarged, as
have the right of prior reviews and approvals by Service personnel of
many normal managerial functions.
At the same time, there have grown up new problems in relation-
ships between prime contractors and their subcontractors. No longer
are the latter all small and usually nearby firms. Today many of the
largest and most powerful companies are subcontractors to smaller
firms. In many instances, commercial competitors are in prime-sub
relationships, and they are unwilling to submit their cost data, their
know-how, their purchasing techniques or their coteries of suppliers
to the files of a competitor.
Still smaller and newer firms, often with a business based upon
special engineering or developmental break-throughs, contribute to
successful systems design and production, but to expect these firms to
turn over freely to other commercial concerns the special knowledge
that is their life-blood is both unfair and unrealistic.
PROFIT LIMITATION AND RECAPTURE
Business, in our free enterprise system, cannot live without profit.
Free competition of the market place sets the scale of profits each
product or class of products can generate—but not so in defense
procurement. The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 sets limits
of fees which can be fixed in cost plus fixed-fee contracts. ASPR ef-
fectively reduce these by a third, and Service department practices
cut them to a half. Federal income taxes take half the balance. In re-
determinable contracts, profit is not fixed until late in performance or
after completion. Then taxes also take their share.
Only in incentive contracts and in firm fixed-price contracts has
a contractor, through his own skill, a chance to make a profit larger
than the average government-allowed profit. In the former, there is
a ceiling on what he can make; in the latter, the next order's price
will be reduced. In both, taxes again take their share.
In addition, most larger suppliers are subject to statutory re-
negotiation. This is on an annual billings and profit basis, not con-
tract-by-contract. Final determinations are long after-the-fact, and
are wholly subjective determinations by the Renegotiation Board, us-
ing no measurable standards.
The sum of all these has reduced the average profit, after taxes,
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of defense contractors to less than three per cent of sales, and less
than eight per cent of invested capital." These figures are, in turn,
less than half the national average of corporate profits from all sources,
as reported periodically by the National Industrial Conference Board.
The absence of adequate profits from defense work is expensive
to the government for, because of this, contractors must look more to
the government to supply tools and facilities. More crucial, however,
is that less than normal profit allowances are gradually weakening our
defense establishment through plant depreciation and obsolescence.
CONCLUSION
Defense procurement, as presently organized and conducted, in-
herently—and to some extent, inevitably—contains conflicts which
create tensions and disagreements between those engaged in it as policy
makers, procurement or fiscal officials, prime contractors, sub-con-
tractors or suppliers. Some of these are overt and malignant; some
are passive but capable of eruption at any time.
Some of these are between different parts of the government—
such as the legislative versus the executive branches, the General Ac-
counting Office versus the service audit agencies, the Armed Services
versus the AEC or NASA, the contracting personnel versus the fiscal
personnel, the planners versus the budget makers, the civilian versus
the military officer, the Defense Department versus the civilian econ-
omy.
Some of these conflicts and points of tension are between business
in general and the massive power and demands of the government.
Profit limitations and statutory renegotiation in peacetime, disallow-
ances of true costs, repetitive repricing, unilateral rights to change or
to terminate, demands to approve make-or-buy decisions, subcontract-
ing programs, overtime and shift scheduling, inspection and quality
control, purchasing techniques all seem like overly onerous invasions
of management's abilities and prerogatives. The seizure of patents and
property rights without any, or only inadequate, compensation, and
the zeal in setting up competitive suppliers are viewed with hostility
and alarm.
The overriding of common law and contract rights and the use
of raw power to delay payments seem to businessmen and to lawyers
to be nibbles at the free enterprise system and its Constitutional pro-
39 This subject and analysis is the subject of a comprehensive treatment in an
address by Mr. W. A. Neumann, President, Le Laval Separator Company, before a meet-
ing of the Procurement Advisory Committee of the National Security Industrial Associa-
tion, at Hot Springs, Va., on June 22, 1957, and in an address by the writer, entitled
"The Role of Profits in Government Procurement," to the students in the Army Supply
Management Course, Fort Lee, Va., on January 22, 1958. Copies are believed available
at NSIA (as to the former) and Ft. Lee (as to the latter).
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tections with dangerous and far-reaching consequences, and yet they
fear to bring so important a customer to court to test the validity of
these actions.
Subcontractors view prime contractor controls and demands with
as much alarm as business generally feels toward the government, and
seek to protect their corporate privacy and trade secrets at all costs.
Lurking throughout are the political conflicts and overtones which
only partly are free from self-interest and personal aggrandizement.
WHAT CAN BE DONE
There are no easy or certain solutions, or ways in which these
conflicts can be resolved and their resulting tensions lessened. Neither
do they fall within any single pattern or group of patterns, nor do they
appear in the same way from one time to the next.
Yet to recognize that conflicts do exist, and to understand the
reasons why each opposing viewpoint is held, goes a long way toward
successfully finding resolutions of them. A more careful analysis and
study of them in academic atmospheres might lead to effective long-
range solutions. Certainly new studies of organizational structures,
both in and out of government, can help to decentralize authority and
thus to hasten decision-making.
The public should pay more attention to what is going on and
its implications to their economy, to their taxes, to their freedoms and
to the rights of free enterprise to manage, to take risks, and to make
and keep profits. Where legal concepts are apparently violated, or
Constitutional guarantees are ignored or emasculated, these should be
subjected to judicial review and determination. Lawyers can them-
selves aid clients in these decisions.
Finally, trust must be restored in government, in business and in
individuals. If suspicion that individuals tend to be venal, that corpora-
tions are incapable of high ideals and patriotism, that men do not deal
with each other truthfully, that politicians are not truly serving their
country and the people to the best of their capabilities, are the only
tenets we can live by—it would indeed be a sad world. The murderer
makes the headlines, but millions are safe from murder every day.
Let us look at the live and regal strength of our people, not their iso-
lated failures, and trust each other. Then we can make a start at
eliminating tensions, friction and red tape—and at saving millions of
dollars wasted in defense procurement because of fear and suspicion.
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